The Double Bind: Unequal Treatment for Homosexuals Within the American Legal Framework by Brunelli, Heather C
Boston College Third World Law Journal
Volume 20




The Double Bind: Unequal Treatment for
Homosexuals Within the American Legal
Framework
Heather C. Brunelli
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Third World Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Heather C. Brunelli, The Double Bind: Unequal Treatment for Homosexuals Within the American Legal
Framework, 20 B.C. Third World L.J. 201 (2000), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj/vol20/
iss1/14
THE DOUBLE BIND: UNEQUAL 
TREATMENT FOR HOMOSEXUALS WITHIN 
THE AMERICAN 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
HEATHER C. BRUNELLI* 
The American legal system has a checkered past with respect to 
equality of justice for minorities. l The legal system has come a long 
way from the days when women were legally excluded from the pro-
fession of law2 and African Americans were considered property. 3 
However, today, there is another minority class that the American le-
gal system openly discriminates against-homosexuals.4 
In 1990, former associate justice of the United States Supreme 
Court Lewis F. Powell, Jr. stated that he thought he "probably made a 
mistake" when he cast the tie-breaking vote in the Supreme Court 
case Bowers v. Hardwicll.5 In Hardwich, a lll~Orit:y of the Supreme Court 
refused to apply the constitutional right of privacy to homosexual re-
lations between consenting adults.6 Hardwich was a due process chal-
lenge to a Georgia statute that made sodomy a crime punishable by 
up to twenty years in prison.' In 1982, Hardwick was charged with the 
crime of sodomy when a police officer entered the bedroom of his 
* Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
I See, e.g., Dred Scott y. Sanford. 60 U.S (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1857) (holding that a 
slaye made free by being brought to a state without slayen' does not become a citizen of 
the United States through this action, and is still property); Plessy \'. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537,548 (1896) (holding that separate but equal was constitutional); Korematsu Y. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1944) (holding the intentment of Japanese Americans in 
internment camps during ""'orld ''''ar II constitutional). 
2 See generally, e.g., In re BI'adwell, 55 III. 535 (1869). This case was heard and deter-
mined on Sept. 1869, but was unayoidabh' omitted from its proper place in the report of 
cases from that tenn. It is ayailable on ''''estlaw at 1869 WL 5503 (III) and on LEXIS at 
1876 III. LEXIS 537. 
S See, e.g., Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 HO\\'.) at 451. 
4 See generally Bowers \'. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Romer y. EYallS, 517 U,S. 620 
(1996) . 
5 See Linda Greenhouse, H7wn Second Thoughts In Case Come Too Late, N.Y. TIMES, Noy. 5, 
1990, at A14. 
6 See generally Hardwich, 478 U.S. 186. 
7 See id. at 187-88. 
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home where he and another adult male were engaged in oral sex.B 
According to the Supreme Court, the issue in the case was "whether 
the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homo-
sexuals to engage in sodomy," and from that concluded that no such 
fundamental right exists.9 Despite the fact that the Georgia law ap-
plied equally to opposite sex sodomy, the Court refused to interpret 
the case as dealing with a broader right to sexual privacy between 
consenting adults.l° The Supreme Court's decision in this case has 
been widely criticized. ll Despite this criticism, Hardwick remains good 
law.12 
Due to the decision in Hardwick, states have been able to retain 
their statutes that make homosexual acts illegal.l3 This fact can com-
8 See id.; PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS: SIXTEEN AMERICANS 
WHO FOUGHT THEIR WAY TO THE SUPREME COURT 395 (1990). 
9 See Hardwick, 4i8 U.S. at 190-91. 
10 See id. at 190. 
11 See generally, e.g., Thomas J. Coleman, Jr., Disordered Liberty: Judicial Restrictions on the 
Rights to Privacy and Equality in Bowers v. Hardwick and Baker v. Wade, 12 T. MARSHALL L. 
REv. 81 (1986); Daniel O. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Pmcess, 62 IND. LJ. 
215, 221-3i (198i); Anne B. Goldstein, Histol)" Homosexuality, and Political \lllues: Searching 
for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE LJ. lOi3 (1988); Frank Michel-
man, Law's Republic, 9i YALE LJ. 1493 (1988); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Plivacy, 102 
HARV. L. REv. i3i (1989); Annamay T. Sheppard, Private Passion, Public Outrage: Thoughts 
on Bowers v. Hardwick, 40 RUTGERS L. REv. 521 (1988); Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowel'S v. 
Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 648 (198i); Symposium, Law, 
Community and .Horal Reasoning. ii CAL. L. REv. 4i5 (1989); Norman Vieira, Hardwick and 
the Right of Privacy, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1181 (1988). 
12 v\11ile Hmdwick has never been reversed or overruled, some decisions have limited 
its holding. See, e.g., Watkins v. U.S. Army, 83i F.2d 1428, 1438-39 (9th Cil'. 1988)(noting 
that "nothing in Hardwick suggests that the state may penalize gays for their sexual orien-
tation," and that "nothing in Hardwick actually holds that the state may make invidious 
distinctions when regulating sexual conduct"). 
13 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1412 (West 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 
(Michie 199i); FL4.. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16--6--2 (1996); 
IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1995); Ky. REy. STAT. ANN. 
§ 510.100 (Michie 1990); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 199i); MD. CODE ANN. art. 2i 
§§ 553-554 (1996); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ i50.158, i50.338 (1990); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 9i-29-59 (1994); J\10. REv. STAT. § 566.090 (19i9); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101 (20), 
45-5-505 (1997); NE". REv. ST.,H. ANN. § 201.190 (J\lichie 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1ii 
(199i); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-
op.fll985); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.01 (1),21.06 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § i6-
5-403 (Supp.fll995); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 1996). For instance, the language 
of the Arkansas law is as follows: "Sodomy. (a) A person commits sodomy if such person 
performs any act of sexual gratification invoh'ing: (1) The peneu'ation, however slight, of 
the anus or mouth of an animal or a puson by the penis of a person of the same sex or an 
animal; or (2) The penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anus of an animal or a 
person by any body member of a person of the same sex or an animal. (b) Sodomy is a 
Class A misdemeanOl." ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1997). 
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plicate a homosexual person's expeIience in the courU·oom. For ex-
ample, a homosexual witness may be impeached for prior crimes in-
volving moral turpitude if he or she has ever been convicted of homo-
sexual sodomy.14 In addition, consider a situation in which a 
homosexual has been accused of rape or sexual assault on a person of 
the same sex and then uses a defense of consent. This might be used 
against him or her in a prosecution for homosexual sodomy, even if 
he or she is acquitted of the rape or sexual assault charges.I5 
Not only do homosexuals face problems as witnesses and defen-
dants, but they may also encounter difficulties when they are \ictims 
of crimes.I6 For example, many states have legal standards that classif)' 
a homosexual advance as sufficient provocation to incite a "reason-
able man to lose his self-conU'ol and kill in the heat of passion, thus 
mitigating murder to manslaughter."17 
All of these problems stem from societal confusion about sexual 
orientation, which has its roots in our historically negative attitude 
toward homosexuality.I8 Just as with the unequal justice suffered by 
Mrican Americans and women due to racism and sexism, the key to 
solving the problem of unequal justice for homosexuals lies in chang-
ing social attitudes.I9 
The jury is one of the most important parts of the American legal 
system.20 Our juries are to be comprised of a fair cross-section of soci-
14 See, e.g., Williams Y. State, 316 So. 2d. 362.363.364 (19i5)(where the court describes 
sexual relations between persons of the same sex as a crime involving moral tlll]Jitude 
which can be used to impeach a \\itness). 
15 See, e.g., United States Y. Miller, 3 l\fJ. 292, 292-93 (19ii) (defendant accused of 
rape confessed to the charge of sodomy in order to use a consent defense). A consent 
defense involves a claim that the '\ictim ~ of a rape or sexual assault consented to the sex-
ual act, and if both the defendant and the ,ictim are of the same sex this could open both 
of them up to charges of homosexual sodomy. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16--6--2 (1996); 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01(1). 21.06 (''''est 1994). 
16 See generally Robert B. Mison, Comment, Homophobia in ,\1.anslaughtl'1:· The HOll1ose,\'lwl 
Advance As Insufficient Provocation, 80 CALIF. L. RE,-. 133 (1992) (discussing the use of the 
homosexual advance defense to mitigate murder to manslaughter ,,-here the ,ictim alleg-
edly made a homosexual advance toward the defendant);Joshua D1-essler. H71en "Heterosex-
ual" Men Kill ''Homosexual'' A1.en: Refledions on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the "Rea-
sonable Man" Standard. 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY i26 (1995) (criticizing and 
commenting on Mison's article). 
17 SeeMison, supra note 16, at 133. 
18 See i Ilji-a Part I. 
19 Cf illji-a Part I. 
20 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The jury is so important that the Constitution of 
the United States guarantees a jury trial in criminal prosecutions. See id. 
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ety.21 Jury bias against homosexuals and the common assumption of 
heterosexuality are the highest hurdles society faces in dealing with 
unequal justice for homosexuals. Such bias against a homosexual de-
fendant can result in the person being convicted for being homosex-
ual, rather than for the crime charged.22 A witness may not be be-
lieved because of his or her sexuality-an issue entirely irrelevant to 
whether or not they are telling the truth at trial-rather than for any 
reason related to his or her credibility.23 Further, jury bias against a 
homosexual victim can mean that an accused aggressor against this 
"ictim will be acquitted or may serve less time for that aggression siIn-
ply because the jury perceived the victim as more deserving of what 
happened to him or her.24 
This Note will explore the problem of unequal justice for homo-
sexuals by focusing on jury bias. Part I discusses the current social 
perceptions of homosexuality and the psychology of jury bias, and 
how the two can affect the treatment of homosexuals within our jus-
tice system. In Part II, this Note discusses how rape shield statutes can 
affect homosexual "ictims and defendants in rape and sexual assault 
cases differently than their heterosexual counterparts. Part III exam-
ines the use of the homosexual advance defense as mitigation for 
murdering a homosexual victim. Part IV then discusses how to deal 
with our current jury bias and whether there should be voir dire into 
jurors' sexuality or views on homosexuality. Finally, this Note argues 
that unequal justice for homosexuals within our justice system is cre-
ated by allowing jury bias to prevail and that utilizing voir dire to as-
certain jury views about homosexuality may be the best hope in com-
bating this h~ustice. 
I. SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURIES 
Federal law states that juries are to be made up of a fair cross-
section of society with the hope that varying views will be repre-
21 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (1994); Straudel'v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 
(1879) (holding a West Virginia law precluding Blacks from sitting on jmies to be a viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause). 
22 See Teresa Eileen Kibelstis, Student Article, Preventing Violence Against Gay Men and 
Lesbians: Should Enhanced Penalties at Sentencing Extend to Bias Crimes Based On Victim s Sexual 
Orientation, 9 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 309, 325 (1995). 
23 SeeWilliamsv. St.'He, 316 So. 2d. 362, 363, 364 (1975). 
24 See i Ilji'a Part III. 
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sented.25 Accordingly, it is important to understand how a jury 
reaches its conclusions and what views a jury represents to be effective 
in persuading ajury on issues important to the case.26 
Recent polls show that our country is fairly evenly dhided over 
whether "homosexual relations between consenting adults" should be 
lega1.27 If a jury truly is a representative cross-section of society, 
roughly half of the people on the jury would believe that homosexual-
ity should be illegal.28 Therefore, when a defendant is homosexual, 
half the jury may already assume the person has done something ille-
gal.29 
In addition to society's views on the legality of homosexuality, 
Americans are also divided on what they think of homosexuality in 
general terms.30 Although close to 50% of people reported in 1985 
that they were not uncomfortable around gay men and lesbians, and 
in 1996, 56% of people reported they had a friend or acquaintance 
who was gay, 56% of people described themselves as not being a sup-
porter of gay rights in a 1994 survey.31 Research shows however, that if 
ajuror has a gay friend or relative, she is more likely to have a posith"e 
attitude toward gay men and lesbians, suggesting that much of juror 
25 See 28 U.S.CA. § 1861 (1994); Williamsy. State. 399 U.S. 78.100 (1970)(stating that 
"the essential feature of a jury obyiously lies in the interposition between the accused and 
his accuser of the COlllmonsense judgment of a group of laymen. and in the commtlllity 
participation and shm'ed responsibility that results from that group's determination of 
guilt or innocence") . 
26 See Mark S. Sobus. Commensumbility.· Understanding JIWY Research and Juror Information 
Processing, 65 DEF. COUNS.J. 408, 408 (1998). 
27 See Alan S. Yang. Attitudes Toward Homosexuality, PUB. OPINION Q .. Fall 1997, at 477, 
487. A 1994 New York Times/CBS News poll showed that 45% of respondents thought 
homosexuality should be legal and 46% thought it should not be legal. See id. 
28 See id. 
29 See, e.g., William N. Eskl'idge, Jr .• PrivaC)' Jurisprudence and the A.partheid of the Closet, 
1964-1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. RE,". 703" 786 (1997) (noting case where jmy deliberated for 
forty hours and e"eutually deadlocked because one juror "would yote a homosexual guilty 
'until Hell froze oyer'"). Consider Federal Rules of E,idence 608. 609 and 403 on the ad-
missibility of specific instances of conduct. See FED. R. E'"ID. 403; FED. R. EHD. 608; FED. R. 
EnD. 609. Rule 608 excludes extrinsic e"idence of prim bad acts. See FED. R. E'·ID. 608. 
Additionally, a witness may be examined about these prior acts onl\' if probath'e of the 
truthfulness or untruthfulness of that \\itness. See FED. R. EHD. 608. It is also \\ithin the 
judge'S discretion to exclude the e"idence if its probatiye \'alue is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice. See FED. R. EnD. 403. The purpose of these limitations is 
to gum'd against ajUlT comicting a defendant for the prior bad acts or for the propensit\· 
to commit a crime. See FED. R. EnD. 608 (Committee Notes). 
30 SeeYallg, supm note 27, at 489, 491. 
31 See id. at 489. 491. 493. 
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bias stems from an inability to identify with a homosexual lifestyle, 
due to a lack of'exposure to such a lifestyle.32 
vVhat does this mean once such people are sitting in a jury box? 
Psychological research on jury decision making suggests that most 
jurors: 
construct relatively simple narratives or "stories" in order to 
make sense of the evidence presented in a trial; most jurors 
construct these stories very early in the attorney's opening 
statements; these stories then guide jurors' evaluation of the 
evidence during the cases in chief; and-most important for 
the present purposes-these stories generally arise from ju-
rors' personal experiences regarding issues similar to those 
in the trial. 33 
This means that jurors' "biases and personal experiences influence 
their perceptions of the evidence presented at trial."34 Therefore, a 
juror's attitudes toward, and exposure to, homosexuality will affect 
jury deliberations.35 
Prosecutors and defense attorneys will use this information in 
selecting a jury in a case involving homosexuality.36 Jury selection is 
big business.37 Jury consultation firms can charge in the range of 
$100,000 for large trials.38 Because trial attorneys know that the com-
position of a jury will have a great effect on the outcome of a trial, 
many are willing to pay high fees to engage consultants to help them 
select the jury. 39 
32 See D .. u .. y She .. rod & Pete .. M. Na .. di. Homophobia in the Courtroom: .{n Assessment of 
Biases Against Gay Alen and Lesbians in a Multiethnic Sample of Potential Jurors. in STIGMA AND 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION: UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AGAINST LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND 
BISEXUALS 24, 36 (G .. egory 1\1. Herek ed., 1998), 
33 Id. at 27 (citing to a study done by Pennington & Hastie, 1992), 
34 Id. 
35 See generally She .... od & Na .. di, supra note 32 at 25, 27, 33-36, 
36 See Judith H. Germano, Note, Preserving Perempt0l1es: A Practitioners Prerogative, 10 ST. 
JOHN'S]' LEGAL COMMENT 431, 432 (1995) (stating that, when selecting a jury, both sides 
use pe .. empton challenges to exclude people they feel are predisposed to the opposition's 
side); Paul R. L\'lld, Juror Sexual O'1entation: The Fair Cross-Section REquirement, Privacy, Chal-
lenges for Calise, and Peremptories, 46 U,C.L.A. L. RE\,. 231, 242 (1998); James Peterson, 
Comment, Behind the Curtain of Pl1vacy: How Obscenity Law Prohibits the Expression of Ideas 
.{bout Sex and Gender; 1998 WIS. L. RE,'. 625, 641-42 (1998). 
37 See Solomon M. Fulero & Steven D, Penrod, The Myths and REalities of Attorney Jury Se-
lection Folhlore and Scientific JllI)' Selection: H7wt Horhs?, 17 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 229, 229 (1990). 
38 See id. 
39 See Deb .. a Sahler, Comment, Scientifically SelectingJurors ~Hlile 11{aintaining PTOfessional 
REsponsibility: ,{ Proposed ."Hodel Rule, 6 ALB. LJ. SCI. & TECH. 383,402-03 (1996). 
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Opinions vary widely on what makes a good jury in any particular 
case.40 Attorneys historically have considered such criteria as occupa-
tion, gender, race and ethnicity, demeanor and appearance, wealth 
and social status, religion, marital status, and age.41 All the work of 
considering criteria and hiring cOllSultants is done to find a jury that 
will be favorably disposed to the client's position in the case. 42 This 
phenomenon is in direct conflict with the supposed purpose of the 
jury system: securing an impartial fact finder. 43 There is no reason to 
believe, however, that attorneys will not engage in selecting a jury on 
the basis of what they believe each juror feels about homosexuality.44 
Once a jury is selected, the attorneys can use rules of evidence 
and legal defenses to manipulate jury biases ill favor of their posi-
tion.45 This creates a situation where an attorney can use an indhid-
ual's sexuality, regardless of whether it is a valid issue in a case, to the 
detriment of that indhidual, creating one form of justice for hetero-
sexuals and quite another sort for homosexuals.46 
II. RAPE SHIELD STATUTES AND H0l\10SEXUALITy4i 
A. The History and Policy of Rape Shield Statutes 
Historically, rape prosecution was as much a trial of the alleged 
,ictim as it was of the defendant.48 Courts t)pically required a \ictim to 
40 See Fulero & Penrod, supra note 37, at 230-37; Abbe Smith, '~Vice Horh iflou Can Get 
It": ''Ethical''jury Selection in Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. RH. 523, 549 (1998). 
41 See Folero & Penrod, supra note 37, at 230-37. 
42 See Development in the Law-The Civiljlll)" 110 HAR". L. RE". 1408, 1464 (1997). 
43 See id. Much has been written on discrimination in jury selection and how it can 
work against the idea of fairness in our justice system. See generaIZl', e.g., Edward S. Adams & 
Christian S. Lane, Constructing ajury that is Both ImjJartial and RejHesentative: ['tilhing CZlIIlll-
lative loting injury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. RE". 703 (1998); Hiroshi Fukurai & Darryl Dayies, 
Affirmative Action in jW)' Selection: RadalZ1' Representative juries, Racial Quotas, and A.ffirll/ative 
juries of the Hennepin Model and the jlll)' de Medietate Linguae, 4 \A. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 645 
(1997). 
44 See Lynd, supra note 36, at 231, 249; Peterson, supra note 36. at 641-42. 
45 See infra Parts I.B, II. 
46 See Developments in the Law--Sexual Oril'lltation and the Law, 102 HARY. L. RE,-. 1508, 
1551-54 (1989) [hel'einafter Sexual Orientation]; Kristin S. Dodge, ''Bashing Bach": Gay and 
Lesbian Street Patrols and the Criminaljustice Systelll, 11 L-\,,· & INEQ. J. 295, 360-61 (1993). 
47 For a more in-depth look at this subject, see generally Elizabeth J. K.ramer, Note, 
n7zell Men are nctims: AppZ1'ing Rape Shield Laws to ,\fa Ie Sallie-Sex Raj)(', 73 NYU. L. RE". 293 
(1998); Cindy Ellen Hill, Chichen-Hawh!: Evidl'llce of a Complainant's HOII/osexuality ender 
lennollt's Rape Shield Law, 22 VT. L. RE". 711 (1998). 
48 See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE LJ. 1087, 1094 (1986). 
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refute a defense of consent by proof of "overwhelming force and ut-
most resistance."49 Men's fear of the innocent man being unjustly ac-
cused of rape drove the common law.5o The testimony of rape victims 
was greatly distrusted due to fear that women would lie about the con-
sensual nature of the sex "to blackmail men, to explain the discovery 
of a consensual affair, or because of psychological illness."51 The past 
sexual history of the alleged victim was relevant in rape trials where 
consent was the defense because courts considered it more likely that 
a woman who had consented to sex before would have consented to 
sex in the instance at issue.52 Therefore, courts further victimized vic-
tims of rape by permitting past sexual behavior or predispositions into 
evidence.53 
This allowance prohibited many rape victims from coming for-
ward and reporting rapes.54 In response to this problem, many states 
and the federal courts passed rules of evidence that restrict the admis-
sibility of evidence of a victim's past sexual history. 55 When drafting 
these so-called rape shield statutes, legislators had four major policy 
goals in mind: "[t]he need to increase the reporting of rape, the rec-
ognition of the lack of probative value of prior consensual acts, the 
lack of connection between chastity and truthfulness, and the need to 
reduce acquittals of guilty defendants. "56 The committee note for the 
federal rule even states that "[t]he rule aims to safeguard the alleged 
victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and 
sexual stereot)ping that is associated with public disclosure of inti-
mate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the fact-
finding process."57 The committee also stated that the policy behind 
the rule was not just to protect the alleged victims' privacy, but also to 
49 See Jane E. Larson, "Even a Horm Will Tum at Last ": Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth-
Cell till)' .-lmerica, 9 YALEJ.L & HUMAN 1, 11 (1997). . 
50 See Estdch, supra note 48, at 1095. 
51 See Cynthia Ann Wicktom, Note, Focusing on the Offender's Forcejitl Conduct: A Proposal 
for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. RE,·. 399, 403 (1988). 
52 See Rachel M. Capoccia, Note, Piercing the Hdl of Tears: The Admission of Rape Crisis 
COllnselor Records in.-lcquaintance Rape Trials, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1335, 1343-44 (1995). 
53 See Kramer, supra note 47, at 303. 
54 See Da\'id P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1195-96 (1997); Francis A. Gilligan et. aI., The The01)' of "Uncon-
scious Transference": The Latest Threat to the Shield Laws Protecting the Privacy of Victims of Sex 
Offenses, 38 B.C. L. REv. 107, 136 (1996). 
55 See Estdch, supra note 48, at 1111 n.63; FED. R. EnD. 412. 
56 I\.ra!ller, supra !lote 47, at 303. 
57 FED. R. EnD. 412 (Committee Note). 
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"encourage victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to partici-
pate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders. "58 
By acknowledging that prior sexual history is not relevant, the 
rape shield statutes recognized that just because a person has con-
sented to sex with someone in the past, it does not mean that they 
consented to the instance of sexual behavior at issue in the trial.59 
Rape shield laws were enacted to protect female victims of opposite-
sex rape.60 Legislators did not intend to protect male victims. nor did 
they consider the consequences of these laws for defendants or dc-
thns in same-sex rape.61 
B. Application of Rape Shield Statutes to Homosexual Defendants 
and l'ictims 
There is no easy way to apply rape shield statutes to instances 
where either the defendant or the victim is a hOlllosexual.62 In an il-
luminating article about the consent defense in male-on-male rape, 
Cindy Ellen Hill considered the situation where a homosexual male 
engages the services of a male prostitute, and, after an argument 
about payment, the prostitute claims rape.63 In her hypothetical situa-
tion the defense is consent, but she suggests that "[iJn the absence of 
admission of evidence of one's character as a homosexual, a typical 
jury would likely presume that there is no possibility whatsoever that a 
male complainant would consent to a sexual act with another male, 
whether or not for monetary compensation. "64 Absent the admission 
of evidence of the alleged victim's prior sexual history, the jury will 
assume the victim is straight and that he would therefore never have 
consented to the act.65 Hill argues that information about this ,ictim's 
sexual history is not only relevant, but essential, for an accurate as-
sessment of the situation by the jury. 66 
One way for the defense to get around the rape shield statute 
may be to offer the information of an alleged \ictim's prior homosex-
58 See id. 
59 See Sakthi Mmphy, Comment, Rejecting en reasonable Sexual Expectations: Limits on Us-
ing a Rape l'ictim s Sexual History to Show the Defendants Mistaken Belief in Consent, 79 CALIF. 
L. REv. 541. 552 (1991). 
60 See Kramer, supra note 47, at 301. 
61 See id. 
62 See Hill, supra note 47, at 714; Kramer. supra note 47. at 297. 
63 See Hill, supra note 47. 
&lId. at 716,717-18. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
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ual acts as evidence of prior bad acts, since homosexual acts are illegal 
in many jurisdictions.67 However, in those same states, this may open 
up the defendant to later prosecution for homosexual acts, even if he 
is acquitted of the rape charge.68 
""nether this information is allowed into evidence through an 
exemption of homosexuals to the rape-shield statutes, as Hill would 
suggest,69 or through some other means, this argument poses a co-
nundrum because it then reestablishes the problem meant to be ad-
dressed by rape shield statutes.70 As in opposite-sex rape, just because 
an alleged victim has consented to sex with persons of the same sex in 
the past, it does not mean that the alleged victim consented to this 
particular instance of sexual conduct.71 The whole purpose of the 
rape-shield statutes was to shield the victim from this jump in 10gic.72 
Therefore, by creating an exception to the rape shield statutes to pro-
tect a homosexual defendant from the jury assumption of hetero-
sexuality, Hill has simply moved the bias from the defendant to the 
,ictim. 
It is juror bias against all homosexuals, victim or defendant, 
which is problematic.73 The additional problems that arise in sexual 
assault and rape cases where either the victim or the defendant is ho-
mosexual have much to do with juror biases and misconceptions and 
they have not been entirely corrected by rape shield statutes.74 Jurors 
are unlikely to believe that a man who is not gay would ever consent 
to sex ,,,ith another man.75 This creates a problem for the defendant 
in a homosexual rape case who wants to use a consent defense, as Hill 
correctly points out, since no e,idence of the victim's homosexuality 
"ill be allowed into e,idence under a rape shield statute. 76 Jurors are 
equally likely, however, to be biased against anyone, victim or defen-
dant, whom they perceive to be gay.77 Therefore, by allowing the ho-
mosexuality of a ,ictim to be explored, the purpose of the rape shield 
statutes is thwarted, and additional juror bias against the homosexual 
67 See id. at 721-22. 
68 See supra note 15 aHd accompanying text; Sexual Orientation, supra Hote 46, at 1520. 
69 See Hill, supra note 47. at 755. 
70 See Kramer. supra Hote 47, at 304-05; FED. R. EnD. 412 (Colllmittee Notes). 
71 See Kramer. supra Hote 47. at 307. 
72 See id.; FED. R. EnD. 412 (Committee Notes). 
73 See Dodge. supra note 46, at 360-61. 
i,! See Hill. supra Hote 47. at 714; Kramer, supra note 47. at 297. 
75 See Kramer, supra Hote 47. at 316. 
;6 See Hill, supra Hote 47. at 714. 
;; See Dodge. supra Hote 46. at 360-61. 
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victim may manifest itself in a finding of not guilty because they did 
not want to favor the victim.78 
Some courts have permitted the admission of evidence that 
would allow jurors to be influenced by biases against homosexuals. 79 
For instance, one trial judge allowed into evidence a minor victim's 
past homosexual acts with a nine-year-old boy in a chil trial against his 
music teacher for sexual abuse.80 Another court refused to apply the 
rape shield statute in a trial for sodomy.81 In that case, the court stated 
that a person who had consented to homosexual acts in the past 
"would be more likely to consent to the act in question than a person 
who had not previously done so. "82 
Other courts, however, have used the rape shield statutes to ex-
clude evidence of past homosexuality.83 For instance, the Ohio Court 
of Appeals held that application of the rape shield statute did not ,io-
late the Constitution where the trial court did not allow e,idence that 
the two victims of sexual assault-the stepsons of the defendant-had 
engaged in homosexual activity with each other.84 Another court was 
even more explicit in stating its reasons why rape shield statutes 
should apply.85 In People v. Hackett, the defendant made an offer of 
proof to admit evidence of the complainant'S reputation for homo-
sexuality to impeach his credibility and to support his defense of con-
sent.86 The court responded that "there is no logical nexus between a 
complainant's reputation for unchastity, whether it involves hetero-
sexual or homosexual activity, and the character trait for truthfulness 
or untruthfulness. "87 The court further stated that "the fact that a per-
78 See Kramer, supra note 47, at 310. For example, in one case the defense offered to 
show that the alleged ,ictim of rape, in a same-sex rape case. had engaged or offered to 
engage in other homosexual acts and thel'efore had consented in this instance at issue. See 
Kvasnikoffv. St.\te, 674 P.2d 302, 304 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). The judge did not allow this 
e~idence into trial for fear that the jury might be confused as to whether they were tI'~ing 
the 'ictim for being a homosexual or whether they were to determine what really hap-
pened on the night in question. See id. 
79 See Judge Rules Plaintiff's Sexual Histol)' Relevant: Teacher Convicted of Abusing Boy May 
IlltroduceEvidence l'ictilll Had Homosexual Relations. PEORIA]' STAR (Illinois). Sept. 18. 1997. 
at B6 (reporting that the court ruled that prior homosexual relations of the ,ictim of sex-
ual abuse were relevant in a chil tI'ial concerning the sexual abuse). 
80 See id. (stating that the judge claimed rape shield statute did not apply). 
81 See State v. Dixon, 668 S.W.2d 123. 125 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
82Id. 
83 See State v. Hart, 678 N.E.2d 952. 954. (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
84 See id. at 953. 954-55. 
85 See People v. Hackett. 365 N.W. 2d 120. 122-23. 126-27. (Mich. 1984). 
86 See id. at 126. 
87Id. 
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son is homosexual, standing alone, has little or no logical relevance 
between the excluded prior sexual acts evidence and the issues of 
consent or credibility."88 
Other courts have made it clear that they were trying to avoid 
jury bias by excluding such evidence.89 In one such case, the trial 
judge decided to keep out evidence of the victim's homosexuality be-
cause of "the probability that its admission would create confusion of 
the issues, confusion in the jury's mind as to whether they're trying 
Mr. vV.K. for being a homosexual, or whether they're really looking at 
what happened on the night concerned. ''90 
In the above cases, the defense wished to introduce evidence 
about the alleged victim to help prove a consent defense.91 However, 
this leaves unanswered questions about instances where the prosecu-
tion wishes to introduce evidence about the victim to refute a consent 
defense.92 
For example, consider People v. Kemblowski, where the prosecution 
in a male-{)n-female rape trial introduced evidence that the victim was 
a lesbian to prove there was no consent.93 The court held that the vic-
tim's sexuality was not her "status," as the prosecution argued, but 
rather pertained to her sexual activity and therefore was barred from 
admission by the rape shield statute.9-! A different twist on this exam-
ple is a case where the prosecution is allowed to introduce evidence 
that the yictim is a lesbian, but by so doing allows the defense to in-
troduce other evidence of the yictim's sexual history to refute the 
claimed lack of consent.95 One such case is State v. Williams, where the 
yictim testified that she did not haye sex with men because she was 
gay.96 The defense then presented a witness who testified that he had 
had sexual relations with the victim.97 The court found that excluding 
this eyidence under the rape shield statute violated the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment constitutional right to confront his accuser.98 The 
court felt that this eyidence was "submitted for more than mere im-
881d. 
89 See KyaSllikofh. State, 6i-! P.2d 302, 304 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). 
90ld. 
91 See id.: Hachett, 36:-> N.W. 2d at 126. 
92 See generally People y. Kelllblowski, 559 N.E.2d 247 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
93 See Kemblowshi, :->:->9 N.E.2d at 248. 
94 See id. at 2:->0. 
93 See State Y. Willial1ls, 487 N.E.2d 560, 560-61 (Ohio 1986). 
96 See id. at 560. 
97 See id. at :->6l. 
98 See id. at 563. 
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peachment of a witness' credibility.''99 Since the proffered evidence 
negated the implied establishment of an element of the crime 
charged, it should have been allowed. loo 
All of these examples illustrate how courts have taken varied ap-
proaches in applying rape shield statutes in cases where either the de-
fendant or the victim is a homosexual. lOl The varied outcomes of the 
courts show that a homosexual victim of rape will not know when or if 
information pertaining to his sexuality will be allowed into e,idence, 
thwarting one of the reasons for hming rape shield statutes.102 The 
decisions also show that courts do not know the best way to deal ,dth 
jury bias against homosexuals, resulting in unequal justice from one 
court to the next.103 
III. HOMOSEXUAL ADVANCE DEFENSE TO MITIGATE MURDER TO 
MANSLAUGHTERl04 
Courts may use the homosexuality of a ,ictim of a crime to lessen 
the punishment imposed on the offender, which suggests that h0111o-
99 [d. 
100 See Williams, 487 N.E.2d at 563. 
101 For other examples of how courts ha\'e dealt with this issue, see gelleralZl' Latzer y, 
Abrams, 602 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D,N.Y 1985) (confmntation rights dolated bv not allowing 
cross-examination of boy and his brothers ,,;th respect to sexual relations ,,;th other men); 
Laughlin v. State, 872 S.W.2d 848 (Ark. 1994) (attempt to cmss-examine \;ctim about sex-
ual relations \dth his bmther ilTele\'ant and impermissible); People v. l\l111pll\', 919 P.2d 
191 (Colo. 1996) (rape shield precludes eddeuce of sexual odeutatiou); People \'. Koou, 
713 P.2d 410 (Colo, Ct. App. 1985) (l4-vear-old boy's prior or subsequeut sexual couduct 
inelevant); People v. Saudoval, 552 N.E.2d 726 (IlL 1990) (defendaut not allowed to intro-
duce evidence that \;ctim engaged iJl anal sex ,,;th another man to rebut \;ctim's testi-
mony); Kelley v, State, 586 N.E.2d 927 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)(e\-idence of \'ictim's alleged 
past sexual conduct was not admissible); Lucado v. State, 389 A.2d 398 (l\ld, Ct. Spec. App. 
1978) (testimony as to \;ctim's alleged lack of reputation as a homosexual did not relate to 
dctim's chastity and should have been allm,'ed); People v. Cm'ich, 661 N.i:S. 2d 369 
(1997) (rape shield statute applicable to preyent testillloll\' of 27-yeaJ'-Old homosexual en-
coullter); Commonwealth v. Quartmau, 458 A.2d 994 (Pa. Super. Ct 1983) (no constitu-
tional ,;olation in apph'ing rape shield statute); State v. Lang, 403 S.E.2d 677 (S.C, Ct. 
App. 1991) (defendant prejudiced bv not being permitted to enter e\;dence of \;ctilll's 
sexuality for plllposes of attacking credibilit\,), 
102 See FED, R. EnD. 412 (Committee Notes) (stating that the purpose of the rule is to 
safeguard alleged \;ctims from im'asion of prh'an' and to encourage \;ctims to participate 
in legal pmceedings against offenders) . 
103 See, e.g., Kvasnikofh. State, 674 P.2d 302, 304 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (judge did not 
allow evidence of alleged victim's past homosexual relations for fear it would undulv 
prejudice the jun- against the dctim); State v. Lang, 403 S.£. 2d at 678 (holding that the 
defendant was prejudiced in not being able to enter evidence of victim's sexualit\,). 
104 For a more complete discussion of this issue, see Dressler, supra note 16; l\lison, su-
pra note 16. 
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sexuals deserve less protection in our criminal justice system than 
heterosexuals.l05 By not considering killing a homosexual to be mur-
der, courts reinforce "the notion that homosexuality is culpable be-
havior and that gay men do not deserve the respect and protection of 
the criminal justice system. "106 
As Robert Mison points out in an article on the "homosexual ad-
vance theory," courts which permit the use of this theory by a defen-
dant allow a non-violent homosexual advance to constitute sufficient 
provocation to incite a reasonable man to "lose his self-control and 
kill in the heat of passion, thus mitigating murder to manslaugh-
ter."107 It must be made clear that the homosexual advance argument 
is distinct from a self-defense argument.10S To use a self-defense ar-
gument, the defendant usually must show that he reasonably believed 
that the other person was using, or was about to use, unlawful physical 
force, or that the use of deadly force was necessary for self-defense 
against death. 109 This is not the case with a homosexual advance de-
fense. 110 There, no actual or threatened physical force on the part of 
the victim is necessary.lll 
Each defense has a different effect on the sentence as well.1l2 
Self-defense is a full defense to a murder charge and allows the de-
fendant to be found not guilty of any crime associated with the behav-
ior in question.l13 A homosexual advance defense is only used to miti-
105 See l\Iison. supra note 16. at 171. 174. 
lOG See id. 
10i See id. at 133. 
108 See id. at 144-46. 
109 See. e.g .. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (1994): AL-\SKA STAT. § 11.81.335 (Michie 1998): 
"-\RIZ. REy. STAT. ANN. § 13-404 (1989). 
no See l\Iison. supra note 16. at 1-10-41. 
III Cf id. (elements of pmyocation ma" include the presence of heat of passion. ex-
treme mental or emotional disturbance. or a sudden quaITel). 
112 See. e.g .• THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRII\UNAL, OF THE SU-
PERIOR COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-
CRIMINAL § 5.12, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE IN SELF-DEFENSE (6th ed.) (1996) [hereinafter 
SELF-DEFENSE]: THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, OF THE 
SUPERIOR COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 8.37, MANSL-\UGHTER(6th ed.) (1996). Self-defense is an 
affinnati"e defense that, if pmyed. allows the defendant to be aquitted of any crime and 
possibly to go free. See SELF-DEFENSE, Sllpra. 
113 See, e.g., SELF-DEFENSE, supra, note 112. l\Iitigation to manslaughter will carry with it 
the sentence for the crime of manslaughter. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 265 § 13 
(West 1994) (allO\\ing sentence of up to twenty years in prison for manslaughter comic-
tion) . 
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gate a murder charge to a manslaughter charge; the defendant will 
not go free.1l4 
For an example of this defense in practice, consider the case of 
Schick v. State.l 15 In this case, the defendant, Schick, claimed that upon 
being propositioned by a man for sex, he kneed him in the stomach, 
hit him in the face and then, when the man fell to the ground, Schick 
"stomped him with his feet."1l6 V\'hen Schick stopped hitting and kick-
ing the man, he heard "gurgling noises" coming from the man's chest 
and throat area.1l7 Then Schick took the man's money and wallet and 
left the scene where the man later died,11s The jury found him not 
guilty of the charge of murder while attempting to commit robbery; 
however, Schick was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter.1l9 
Mison argues that: 
The homosexual advance defense capitalizes on the social 
and individual responses of fear, disgust and hatred with re-
gard to homosexuals. The accused asserts that the victim 
made a homosexual advance, which is presumably a terrify-
ing and disgusting event. A variety of responses-including 
fear, anxiety, anger and hatred-then consumed the ac-
cused. These responses displaced all other possible reac-
tions, including self-control, tolerance and compassion. 
Thus goaded into a heat of passion, the accused killed the 
homosexual victim.12o 
For this theory to work, there must be a jury that Vvill identifY with this 
version of events,121 
Mison argues that the use of the "reasonable man" test is flawed 
in this instance because a "killing based simply on a homosexual ad-
vance reflects neither rational nor exemplary behavior," which he 
views as essential for the reasonable man.122 In J\1ison's idealized 
world, the reasonable man should not "possess prejudices and biases 
such as homophobia and heterosexism. "123 But Mison understands 
114 See Mison. supra note 16. at 133: I\IAss. GEN. L. ANN. Ch. 265 § 13 (West 1994). 
115 5iO N.E.2d 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 
116 See id. at 922. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. at 921-22. 
119 See id. at 922. 
120 l\lison. supra note 16. at 158. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. at 161. 
123 See id. 
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that a homosexual advance defense creates a tension between the 
need for jury rationality and jurors' tendency to draw on unreason-
able prejudice and bias.124 
In fact, homophobia is so widespread that a "fair cross-section of 
the community" is likely to produce a homophobic jury. 125 Therefore, 
regardless of the constitutional restraints on how the jury pool is se-
lected, most juries will be susceptible to homophobia when applying 
the homosexual advance defense.126 
The use of the homosexual advance theory by courts perpetuates 
the abuse against homosexuals within our criminal justice system,127 
By allowing the jury to decide if the homosexual advance should miti-
gate the charge from murder to manslaughter, the court opens the 
door to juror bias against homosexuals.128 Without this mitigating de-
fense, jurors would not have the same opportunity to allow homo-
sexuality into their deliberations since they only would be asked if the 
prosecution had proven that the defendant's actions satisfied all the 
elements of the charge of murder. 129 
Mison explained the effect of allowing homosexual advance de-
fenses to tap into jury bias: 
"\\'hen defendants who kill in response to homosexual ad-
vances are not convicted of murder, courts and juries rein-
force the notion that homosexuality is culpable behavior and 
that gay men do not deserve the respect and protection of 
the criminal justice system.130 
One should not get the impression that all courts allow the ho-
mosexual advance defense in all instances.131 Courts clearly draw the 
12! See id. 
125 See l\1ison, mpra note 16. at 162. 
126 See id. at 162-63. 
127 See id at 177-78. 
128 See id. at 167. 
129 See, e.g., THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, OF THE SU-
PERIOR COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-
CRIMINAL § 8.10, MURDER (6th ed.)(1996). 
130 Mison. supra note 16, at 17·1. 
131 See generally. e.g., State v. Skaggs. 586 P.2d 1279 (Adz. 1978)(declining to require 
manslaughtel' insu'uction); Commonwealth v. Halbert. 573 N.E.2d 975 (Mass. 
1991) (holding that lower court did not err in refusing to insu'uct the jury on voluntary 
manslaughtel'); Commonwealth \'. Medeiros. 479 N.E.2d 1371 (Mass. 1985) (holding that 
the defendant was not entitled to manslaughter instnlCtion); State v. Volk, 421 N.W. 2d 360 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to instruction on heat 
of passion manslaughter). 
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line in some cases where the homosexual adyance defense has no ba-
sis in fact. 132 In Commonwealth v. A1edieros, the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts found that a manslaughter instruction was unneces-
sary.133 The yictim, Lawrence, made a homosexual advance toward 
Medieros, the defendant.134 Medieros warded off the adyance by strik-
ing Lawrence.135 Lawrence then allegedly struck the defendant as he 
was attempting to leave Lawrence's apartment and the defendant 
struck him back, causing him to fall onto the bedp6 The defendant 
then climbed on top of Lawrence and struck him mice more on the 
head.137 At this point Lawrence was unconscious, his face was bloody, 
and he was foaming at the mouth,l38 The defendant then put a pillow 
over Lawrence's face and loosely looped a rope around his neck.139 
The court said that even assuming the victim's adyances constituted 
reasonable provocation, they were not enough to warrant an inyolun-
tary manslaughter instruction. l40 
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota came to a similar result in 
State v. VOUl.141 Yolk was convicted of second degree murder after the 
trial court refused to give a manslaughter instruction.142 Yolk allegedly 
was hitchhiking with his friend Hamilton, who testified that they 
planned to pose as prostitutes, pick up a homosexual man, and rob 
him,143 They encountered the victim, Traetow, at a store and he in-
vited them into his car and to his apartment. l44 Traetow was found 
dead in his apartment with his hands and legs taped. 145 Castro, a 
132 See Skaggs, 586 P.2d at 1284. In this case the victim made a homosexual advance to-
ward Skaggs, who rebuffed it, telling the victim he "'as not atU'acted to men. See id. at 1281. 
The yictilll then suggested they enter into a relationship together and Skaggs replied that 
the victim should wait in the trailer because he was going to do hilll a "big fa\·or." See id. 
Skaggs then went out to his truck and obtained a pistol. retunled to the mobile home and 
shot the victim mice in the head and once in the chest. See id. Skaggs was convicted of 
murder. See id. at 1280. 
133 See Medieros. 479 N.E.2d at 1374-75. 
134 See id. at 1374. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 See Medieros. 479 N.E.2d at 1374. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. at 1376. 
HI See 421 N.W.2d 360. 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
142 See id. at 362, 364. 
143 See id. at 362. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
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friend ofVolk, testified that Yolk had told him what happened.I46 Yolk 
allegedly hit Traetow over the head with a liquor bottle, and then he 
and Hamilton bound Traetow and carried him into the bedroom.147 
When Hamilton went out to the car to search for money, Traetow 
freed himself and attacked Volk.I48 Yolk wrestled with Traetow and 
then shot him twice.H9 
Yolk argued that he was intoxicated, exhausted from travel, re-
volted by Traetow's homosexual advance, and surprised by Traetow's 
attack.15o The court found that, "there was no provocation sufficient 
to elicit a heat of passion response. "151 The court further found that a 
"person of ordinary self-control under like circumstances would sim-
ply have left the scene. "152 
Finally, in the clearest case of insufficient provocation, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts again found no reason to give 
a voluntary manslaughter instruction to the jury.153 In Commonwealth v. 
Halbert, the defendant claimed that he was provoked by the victim's 
homosexual advance, which consisted of the victim's putting his hand 
on the defendant's knee and asking, 'Josh, what do you want to 
dO?"154 
Here, the court framed the issue as follows: "[W]ould the victim's 
nonthreatening physical gesture and verbal invitation have provoked 
a reasonable person into a homicidal rage?"155 The court ignored the 
defendant's history of sexual abuse as having no bearing on a "rea-
sonable man" standard because it is an objective, and not a subjective, 
standard.156 The victim's question was neither insulting nor hostile, 
and it was not a salacious invitation.157 
Another case, Commonwealth v. Carr, is notable for its interesting 
slant on the homosexual advance defense.I58 There, Carr's defense 
146 See l'ii/k, 421 N.W. 2d at 362. 
147 See id. 
1-18 Seeid. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. at 365. 
151 l'ii/k, 421 N.W. 2d at 365. 
152Id. 
153 SeeCOllllllollwealth Y. Halbert. 573 N.E.2d 975, 976 (Mass. 1985). 
154 See id. at 978-79. 
155Id. at 979. 
156 See id. 
157 See id. 
158 580 A.2d 1362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
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was that he shot two women in the head in the heat of passion caused 
by the serious provocation of their nude homosexuallovemaking.l59 
In response, the court stated: 
The sight of naked women engaged in lesbian lovemaking is 
not adequate provocation to reduce an unlavvful killing from 
murder to voluntary manslaughter. It is not an event which is 
sufficient to cause a reasonable person to become so impas-
sioned as to be incapable of cool reflection. A reasonable 
person would simply have discontinued his observation and 
left the scene; he would not kill the lovers.160 
The court compared its result with Folh, but in this instance, the "ho-
mosexual-advance" was not even directed at the defendant. 161 He was 
merely a third party observer of homosexual behavior, and the court 
refused to extend the doctrine to such defendants. 162 
Not all courts refuse to give manslaughter instructions in these 
situations.163 In one such case, the defendant claimed that he went 
with the victim to the victim's trailer where the victim told him a party 
was taking place. l64 No one was in the trailer when they arrived and 
the victim made a homosexual advance which the defendant re-
fused. 165 A struggle ensued, and the defendant stabbed the victim with 
a kitchen knife.l66 The trial judge found that: 
the defendant had acted under a strong provocation; that 
the defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circum-
stances unlikely to recur; that the character and attitudes of 
the defendant indicated that he was unlikely to commit an-
other crime; and that the defendant was particularly likely to 
comply with the terms of the period of probation.l67 
The defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sen-
tenced to a seven-year term, which was ultimately lowered to four 
years.l68 This case illustrates how, when there is a possible physical ad-
159 See id. at 1363. 
160 Id. at 1364. 
161 See id. at 1364-65, 1363. 
162 See id. 
163 See. e.g., People v. Saldivar, 49i N.E.2d 1138 (Ill. 1986). 
164 See id. at 1339. 
165 See id. 
166 See id. 
167 Id. at 1140. 
168 See Saldivar. 49i N .E.2d at 1141. 1145. 
220 Boston College Third norld Law Journal [Vol. 20:201 
vance, some courts will still allow mitigation to manslaughter even 
where there is nothing in the record to show that a reasonable person 
would have been scared of a sexual assault.169 
These cases show that courts are divided on what set of circum-
stances warrants a homosexual advance manslaughter instruction for 
the jury.170 Judges are as susceptible to homophobia as the general 
jury pool.l7l In one notable example of judicial homophobia, a Texas 
judge is quoted as saying that: 
[t]hese two guys that got killed wouldn't have been killed if 
they hadn't been cruising the street picking up teen-aged 
boys. I don't much care for queers cruising the streets pick-
ing up teen-aged boys. I've got a teen-age boy. . .. [I] put 
prostitutes and gays at about the same level. I'd be hard put 
to give somebody life for killing a prostitute.172 
This judge then sentenced the defendant to only thirty years impris-
onment, instead of the maximum term of life, for killing two gay 
men.l 73 
The problems created by allowing homosexual advance defenses 
to go to juries are similar to the problems associated with homosexu-
ality in the context of rape casesP4 In rape cases, 'juries have a ten-
dency to weigh the conduct of the ,ictim in judging the guilt of the 
defendant."175 Although certainly not a perfect answer to the prob-
lem, at least in a rape prosecution the victim can rebut the defen-
dant's claims, which is not true in a homosexual advance case where 
the ,ictim whose actions are attacked is deadP6 This gives rise to the 
potential problem that in every murder case where the victim is ho-
169 See id. at 1139. 
170 See, e.g., State ,'. Skaggs, 586 P.2d 1297, 1284 (Ariz. 1978) (finding voluntary man-
slaughter instmctions unnecessary); SaldivaI; 497 N.E.2d at 1140, 1145 (allowing a mitiga-
tion for provocation); Schick v. State, 570 N.E.2d 918, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing 
comiction for voluntan' manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Mediel'Os, 479 N.E.2d 1371, 
1376 (Mass. 1985) (l'efusing to allow involuntary manslaughter instruction); Common-
wealth ". Halbert, 573 N.E.2d 975, 976 (Mass. 1991) (affirming u'ialjudge's refusal to give 
manslaughter insu'uction); State v. Yolk, 421 N.W.2d 360, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (af-
firming that there was no reason to give manslaughter insu'uction). 
lil See, e.g., Rick Moore, justice is .Vot Blindfor Gays, SAN DIEGO UNION,Jan. 10, 1989, at 
B7; Panel to Examine Remarks uyjudge on Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1988, at A16. 
172 Panel to Examine Remarks bjljudge on Homosexuals, supra note 171. 
1i3 See id. 
1i4 See supra Part II. 
1i5 l\.[iSon, supra note 16, at 171. 
1i6 See id. 
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mosexual, the defendant can claim a homosexual advance defense 
without anyone to rebut the claim that the advance ever even hap-
pened.I77 
IV. JURY VOIR DIRE ON THE ISSUE OF SEXUALITY 
Controversial issues are just beginning to surface in many juris-
dictions about whether there should be voir dire concerning jurors' 
attitudes toward homosexuality or concerning jurors' sexuality and 
exactly how such information, once obtained, should be used. 178 In 
some instances, sexual orientation is the subject matter before the 
jury, not just a peripheral issue due to the fact that one of the parties 
happens to be homosexual.I 79 For example, many states and the fed-
eral government have enacted hate crime legislation prO\iding for 
enhanced punishment for crimes against homosexuals,180 Also, some 
state or local civil rights laws prO\ide remedies for discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation. I81 Therefore, in a case where sexual 
orientation is a central issue before the jury, voir dire of the jury on 
their attitudes toward homosexuality may affect whether the attorneys 
select an impartial jury,182 It is less clear whether the jury should be 
questioned on attitudes toward homosexuality when sexual orienta-
tion is not a central issue in the case, but where one party is homo-
sexual. I83 Considering that jury bias against homosexuals can play a 
crucial role in the outcome of a case where either the defendant or 
the victim is a homosexual, it would seem that jury voir dire could ef-
fectively be used to fight this bias. I84 
This section will explore what the constitutional requirement of a 
"fair cross-section" of the community means. It will then discuss 
whether or not it is permissible or required that courts question jurors 
17i SeeMison. supra note 16, at 171; cf Sexual Orientation. supra note 46. at 154l. 
178 See LYlld. supra note 36, at 246, 236; see generaIZ" United States ' .. Click. 807 F.2d 847 
(1987) (9th Cir. 1986); Commonwealth Y. Plunkett. 664 N.E.2d 833 (1996). 
179 See LYlld. supra note 36, at 236-37. 
180 See id. at 237; see also 18 U.S.CA. § 3Al.1 (1999) (increasing penalty if act found to 
be a hate crime); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.47 (West 1997) (increasing penalties if the 
clime committed because of bias or prejudice) . 
181 See id.; see also Romer \'. E''ans. 517 U.S. 620. 624 (1996) (citing Dem·er Rey. Mu-
nicipal Code, Art. IV §§ 28-91 to 28-116 (1991); Aspen l\lunicipal Code § 13-98 (1977); 
Boulder Re\,. Code §§ 12-1-1 to 12-1-11 (1987». 
182 See LYlld. supra note 36. at 236. 
183 See id. at 238. 
184 See supra Pans II, III; LYlld, supra note 36. at 236. 
222 Boston College Third norld Law Journal [Vol. 20:201 
about their views on homosexuality. Finally, it will discuss the issue of 
whether a court may inquire as to an individual juror's sexuality. . 
A. Constitutional Requirements in Jury Make-up 
As pre\iously discussed in Part I, federal law demands only that 
an impartial jury be drawn from a fair cross-section of the commu-
nity.l85 The Sixth Amendment requires an impartial jury in all crimi-
nal prosecutions.l86 The Supreme Court has interpreted that re-
quirement to mean that an "impartial jury" is simply one where the 
jury will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts. 187 Regarding 
the composition of jury venire, an impartial jury involves a fair cross-
section requirement.188 The Supreme Court has never required a 
'~ury of your peers. "189 Therefore, there is no right to have a jury 
made up of other homosexuals if the defendant is a homosexual, just 
as there is no right to have a jury made up of Mrican Americans if the 
defendant is Mrican American, or of women if the defendant is a 
woman.l90 In Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court stated that there 
is a check on the arbitrary power of the jury if the community is rep-
resented, but "[t]his prophylactic vehicle is not provided if the jury 
pool is made up of only special segments of the populace or if large, 
distinctive groups are excluded from the pool. "191 
This decision suggests that there could be a prohibition on sys-
tematic exclusion from jury venires based on sexual orientation be-
cause lesbians and gay men could be considered a distinctive group.192 
However, it should not be inferred that a particular jury must contain 
homosexual jurors, but only that the pools and panels from which 
185 See 28 U.S.CA. § 1861 (1994). 
186 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
18i See Lockhan Y. !\IcC1-ee, 476 U.S. 162, 178 (1986)(quoting WainWl-ight v. Witt, 469 
U.S. 412, 423 (1985». 
188 See 28 U.S.C.A.§ 1861 (1994). 
189 See Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers ?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Im-
ages, and Procedures, 64 N.C.L. RE,'. 501, 548-50 (1986). But see Strauder Y. West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (,The ,-ery idea of ajmy is a body ... composed of the peers or 
equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to detenlline .... "). 
190 See Batson Y. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79 (1986) (citing Straude1; 100 U.S. at 305 ("[A] 
defendant has no right to a 'petit jUl-y composed in whole 01- in pan of persons of his own 
race. "'». The coun limits this holding by stating that the Equal Protection Clause "forbids 
the States to strike black YeniI-emen on the assumption that they ~in be biased in a particu-
lar case simply because the defendant is black." See id. at 97. See also Massaro, supra note 
189, at 535-36, 537, 556-57. 
191 See 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 
192 See L)11d, supra note 36, at 241. 
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jurors are drawn cannot systematically exclude homosexuals.I93 As 
long as there is no systematic exclusion from the jury pool the Sixth 
Amendment's "fair cross section" requirement is met,194 
B. Can or Must a Court AskJurors About Their Fiews on Homosexuali(,v? 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
concluded that the court does not have to inquire into jurors' atti-
tudes toward homosexuality.I95 In a notable case, the homosexual de-
fendant, Click, challenged his conviction for bank robbery on the ba-
sis that the court erred in refusing to question prospective jurors on 
bias against homosexuals during voir dire.I96 The court held that the 
trial judge has wide latitude in conducting voir dire, and that the con-
viction would only be reversed if there was an abuse of discretion.I97 
The Ninth Circuit also stated that it is an abuse of discretion to fail to 
ask questions reasonably sufficient to test jurors for bias; the court 
may refuse questions that are "tied to prejudice only speculatively. "198 
The court found that although the attorney could have asked 
questions regarding effeminate mannerisms, it was not an abuse of 
discretion to fail to do SO.I99 The trial court could have found that the 
questions were improper because they would unnecessarily call atten-
tion to Click's effeminate mannerisms.2OO 
In cases where the courts have asked jurors about their views on 
sexual orientation, it is uncertain whether courts can ask these ques-
tions to the group in general or whether questioning must be done 
on an individual basis.201 In one case where the defendant was using 
the homosexual advance theory to mitigate his murder charge to 
manslaughter, the judge told the jury that the e\idence might indicate 
that the victim was homosexual or bisexual. 202 The judge asked the 
venire generally: "[I]s there anything about that circumstance which 
193 See id. 
194 See id. at 241-42. 
195 SeeUllited StateS\'. Click. 807 F.2d 847. 848 (9th Cir. 1987). 
196 See id. at 848. 849. 
197 See id. at 850. 
198 See id. at 850 (quoting United Staten. Jones, 722 F.2d 528, 529 (9thCir.1983». 
199 See id. 
200 See Click. 807 F.2d at 850. 
201 See, e.g., Commonwealth Y. Plunkett. 664 N.E. 833, 837 (I\Iass. 1996) (holding that 
questions to the venire collectively were sufficient); State Y. Dishon. 687 A.2d 1074, 1082 
(1997) (holding that ifindhidual mir dire occurs "ithout the defendant present, when he 
specifically requested to be present. his rights were \iolated). 
202 See Plunkett, 664 N.E.2d at 838. 
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would interfere with anyone's ability to be fair and impartial? ... Is 
there anything about that circumstance that would bias or prejudice 
anyone against either the prosecution or defense?''203 
Eight people out of the approximately eighty members of the 
venire came forward in response.204 The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts characterized most of the responses as expressing a bias 
against homosexuals.205 Responses included: 
"In my reasoning, the gentleman who was supposedly mur-
dered did something that caused the murder." 
"I probably wouldn't be fair at all because I just don't like 
[homosexuals]. " 
"I have a bias against homosexuals." 
"I just can't stand them." 
"I find it very hard to understand unnatural acts and I don't 
know if it would prejudice me one way or the other. ''206 
The judge excused each of the eight jurors who came forward in re-
sponse to his questions.207 The Supreme Judicial Court conceded that 
the subject of juror attitudes toward homosexuality might be impor-
tant in a case such as this, but it was not willing to mandate an indi-
vidual voir dire in the circumstances of this case.20B The court felt that 
it should leave the question of an individual voir dire of the jurors to 
the discretion ofthe trialjudge.209 
In an interesting counterpoint to that case, the New Jersey Supe-
rior Court has ruled that a defendant must be present during voir 
dire of indhidual jurors when the questions asked about their views 
on homosexuality are central to the case.210 The court limited the de-
cision to only those cases where the defendant specifically asked to be 
present during the individual questioning.211 In one case, the trial 
judge asked the entire venire whether "the fact that the case involved 
homosexuality and an attitude towards homosexuals would prevent 
them from rendering a fair and impartial verdict. ''212 Mter defense 
203 Id. at 835. 838 & n.3. 
204 See id. at 838. 
205 See id. 
206 Id. at 838 n.4. 
207 See Plunkett. 664 N.E.2d. at 838. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. 
210 See State Y. Dishon. 687 A.2d. 1074. 1076, 1080-81 (1997). 
211 See id. at 1082 n.7. 
212 Id. at 1080. 
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counsel exhausted his peremptory challenges, the judge brought the 
voir dire into his chamber to question each juror individually.213 The 
judge denied the request of the defendant to be present at the voir 
dire for "reasons of security. "214 In chambers, 
[t] he jurors were asked whether they could put [their per-
sonal views toward homosexuality] aside and decide the case 
based upon the evidence. The jurors indicated that they 
could. The judge also inquired whether the jurors had any 
relatives, friends or co-workers whom they believed to be 
homosexual. In addition, the jurors were asked whether they 
would weigh the testimony of a homosexual in the same 
manner as that of any other person. All of the jurors indi-
cated that they would. Most of the jurors were also asked if 
they could give defendant a fair trial if it were revealed that 
he was homosexual or bisexual. The jurors indicated that 
they would.215 
The Superior Court ruled that this was a "iolation of the defendant's 
rights since homosexuality was "the central theme of the prosecu-
tion's case."216 The victim of the crime was homosexual and there was 
evidence that the defendant was bisexual.217 The court based its deci-
sion on the fact that the subject of voir dire was at the heart of the 
case, and "it was important that defendant be present so that he could 
have formed his own impressions of the jurors' demeanor and "isceral 
reactions when they responded to the questions about hOlllosexual-
ity."218 Apparently the court felt that potential jury bias surrounding 
the issue of homosexuality was so important that the comiction of 
manslaughter was overturned.219 
As to the issue of whether a general question to the yenire as a 
whole or individual voir dire is required, the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Maine has answered that general questions are sufficient to safe-
guard against anti-homosexual bias in the jury.220 The court recog-
nized tllat "the existence of anti-homosexual bias in our society re-
213 See id. 
214 See id. 
215 Dishon, 297 NJ. Super. at 1080. 
216 See id. at 1082. 
217 See id. 
218 See id. 
219 See id. at 1082-83. 
220 See State \'. Lambert, 528 A.2d 890. 892 (1987). 
I 
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quires voir dire directed at such prejudice if the evidence might sug-
gest that the defendant is homosexual."221 The court reasoned: 
The presiding justice squarely addressed the potential for 
anti-homosexual bias by asking the array whether evidence 
of the defendant's homosexuality would affect any potential 
juror's ability to decide the case fairly and impartially based 
solely on the evidence provided in the courtroom and the 
court's instruction as to the applicable law. This was followed 
by a general question to elicit from the prospective jurors if 
there was "any reason" anyone of them felt unable to act 
fairly and impartially. No [sic] one of the prospective jurors 
responded affirmatively to either question.222 
The court thereafter reasoned that the trial judge had not abused his 
or her discretion by not pursuing the matter further. 223 The court also 
disregarded the argument made by the defendant that jurors would 
hesitate to admit bias in open court.224 The Supreme Judicial Court 
argued that "questions asked by the court did not contain a potential 
for such undue embarrassment to a potential juror as to require indi-
vidual voir dire. "225 
'While questioning jurors en masse about biases might have a 
chilling effect on jurors' willingness to be forthright, there might not 
be much of a difference between en masse and face-to-face with an 
imposing judge in individual voir dire.226 Neither process may root 
out all biases held by jurors, but such questioning, although not a per-
fect solution, could help to alleviate the problem of jury bias against 
homosexuals.227 
C. Can a Court Ask Individual Jurors About Their Sexual Orientation? 
It may be excessive to require or allow jury voir dire into the 
sexuality of members of the jury because it may not be probative of 
bias and it could be an invasion of the jurors' privacy interest.228 The 
2211d. 
2221d. 
223 See id. 
224 See id. 
225 Lambert, 528 A.2d at 892. 
226 See Brent J. Gurney, Note, The Case for A.bolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal 
Tlials, 21 HAR'-. C.R.-C.L. L. RE\,. 227, 268-72 (1986). 
227 See id.; LyllC\, supra note 36, at 236. 
228 See Lynd, supra note 36, at 258, 279-80. 
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Supreme Court has remained silent on this issue.229 In United States v. 
Barnes, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district 
court's refusal to ask jurors their racial and ethnic backgrounds or 
religious affiliations.230 The Second Circuit considered these inquiries 
unnecessary since "[w]hatever prejudice may be shared by members 
of any ethnic group as to black persons would have been uncovered 
by the questioning about attitudes toward blacks. "231 
The courts suggest that jurors have some personal privacy rights 
when summoned for jury service.232 These interests prohibit certain 
personal questions when the information is not essential to the case 
or when other less intrusive questioning would be sufficient to dis-
close any disqualifying bias.233 Therefore, to be able to ask a juror 
about his or her sexuality, two conditions must exist.234 First, it must 
be clear that sexual orientation-related bias might bear on delibera-
tions.235 An attorney can easily establish this requirement in a ca~e 
where sexual orientation is an element of a statutory complaint, such 
as in a prosecution for perpetrating a hate crime against a homosex-
ual or a state civil rights action based upon discrimination due to sex-
ual orientation.236 In instances where a defendant or a ,ictim is a ho-
mosexual, jury bias may affect the outcome of the case, but asking 
jurors about their own sexuality does not appear to be constitutionally 
acceptable.237 
The second condition, that less intrusive questioning would be 
insufficient to disclose jury bias, would also preclude most instances 
229 See id. at 257 & n.131 (citing Press-Entelvrise Co. y. Superior Court. 464 U.S. 501, 
514 (1984) (BlackIllun, j., concurring) ("''''e need not decide. howeyer. whether a juror. 
called upon to answer questions posed to him in court during yoir dire. has a legitimate 
expectation, rising to the status of a prh-acy right, that he "ill not ha"e to answer those 
questions. ") ). 
230 SeeLynd, supra note 36, at 257. 
231 /d. at 257-58. 
232 See id. at 258. 
233 See id. 
234 See id. 
235 See Lynd, supra note 36, at 261. 
236 See. e.g., Romel' ". E,-ans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (citing Dem'er Rey. Municipal 
Code, Art. IV §§ 28-91 to 28-116 (1991); Aspen Municipal Code § 13-98 (1977); Boulder 
Re,'. Code §§ 12-1-1 to 12-1-11 (1987»; CAL. PENAL CODE 422.6(a)(b)(West 1988 & 
Supp.1993). 
237 See generally United States Y. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2nd Cir. 1979). Barnes holds that 
yoir dire on the ethnic background of jurors is not required where prejudice shared by 
members of an ethnic gl'oup as to black persons would haye been uncoyered by the ques-
tions about attitudes toward blacks. See id. at 140. 
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of asking jurors' their sexual orientatioi1.238 It appears to be an inva-
sion of privacy to ask about the jurors' own sexuality when any bias 
against homosexuals could be discovered by simply questioning jurors 
about their attitudes toward homosexuals.239 
It seems clear that questioning jurors about their own sexual ori-
entation constitutionally infringes on a juror's right to privacy.240 In 
addition, it would be just as effective to simply inquire into attitudes 
about homosexuality.2-!l However, there is no reason to believe that 
jurors would answer these inquiries truthfully or accurately.242 VVhat 
makes a person homosexual or bisexual or straight has not been 
clearly defined.2-!3 Also, not all persons who consider themselves to be 
homosexual are ready or willing to admit as much publicly.244 Asking 
jurors such questions could anger them, especially since jurors are 
generally already unenthusiastic about serving.2-!5 
A trial lawyer must therefore use both challenges for cause and 
peremptory challenges in an attempt to seat the least biased jury.246 A 
challenge for cause "removes those jurors who either admit to actual 
bias or those who admit to circumstances from which the law will infer 
an overwhelming potential for bias. ''247 Therefore, questioning jurors 
about their attitudes toward homosexuality would allow a trial lawyer 
to use challenges for cause to eliminate any juror who admits to a 
bias.248 Asking a juror his or her sexual orientation would not warrant 
the same result.249 Most courts will not imply a bias sufficient to war-
rant for-cause challenges when they are based simply upon sexual ori-
entation.25o 
238 See LYlld, Sllpra note 36, at 265. 
239 See id. at 255-67 (describing juror privacy interest). 
210 See id. at 265. 
211 See id. at 270. 
212 See id at 267. 
213 See Lynd, supra note 36, at 267. 
2H See id. at 268-69. 
m See id. at 270. 
216 See Jennifer Lee Urbanski, Casenote, Georgia v. j\1.cCollwn: Protecting jurors from Race 
Based Peremptol)' Challenges But Forcing Criminal Defelldants to Risk Biased juries, 24 PAC. LJ. 
1887, 1890-91 (1993). 
217 Id. at 271. For a more complete discussion of how to use challenges for cause and 
peremptory challenges, see id. at 270-87. 
218 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Plunkett, 664 N.E.2d. 833, 838 (Mass. 1996) (trial judge 
struck jurors fOJ' cause after they admitted bias or ambivalence toward homosexuals). 
219 See L\'lld, supra note 36, at 274. 
250 See id. at 276-78. 
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Attorneys exercise peremptory challenges without stating reason 
for excluding that juror.251 The use of peremptory challenges has 
been limited when racial or gender discrimination allegedly motiYates 
the challenge.252 This limitation suggests the same reasoning could be 
extended to prohibition of peremptory challenges based on sexual 
orientation, but this has not yet been the case.253 Therefore, although 
questioning jurors about their sexual orientation and then excluding 
them from the jury on the basis of their answers would be allowable, it 
is only a reasonable tactic to use when the challenging party wants to 
retain a biased jury by excluding all homosexuals from the jury, and is 
useless for a party wishing to haye an unbiased jury. 254 
The questioning of jurors about their sexual orientation is clearly 
problematic. Such inquiry could infringe on jury priyacy rights,255 is 
not a good indicator of jury bias,256 could anger or embarrass ju-
rors,257 and will only allow the use of peremptory challenges.258 There-
fore, allowing jury yoir dire on the subject of jurors' sexual orienta-
tion is probably unnecessary, and possibly damaging, to the 
questioning party's case. 
CONCLUSION 
In the United States today, a homosexual indiyidual cannot ex-
pect the same quality of justice that similarly situated heterosexual 
persons might receiye.259 Many Americans remain confused about 
how to deal with different sexual orientations.260 As a result, many 
251 See Smith Y. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 (1982)(O·Connor.J.. concurring). 
252 See Lmd. sujJra note 36. at 282-84 (citing Batson Y. Kentuch. 476 U.S. 79. 87 
(1986); Pmkett Y. Elem. 514 U.S. 765. 767. 768. 769 (1995)(per curiam); Georgia Y. l\fcCol-
hun, 505 U.S. 42. 43 (1992) ;J.E.B. Y. Alabama ex. reI. T.B .. 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994». 
253 See L\11d. supra note 36, at 282. 
254 See Lynd. supra note 36, at 232-33 (discussing People \'. "11ite. 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 
(Ct. App. 1981». There is a suggestion that. in a noted trial of a man accused of killing a 
homosexual politician in San Francisco, delibel'ate efforts were made by the prosecutor to 
exclude all lesbians and gay men from the jun', See id. 
255 See supra uote 237-40 and accompall\'ing text. 
256 See supra note 241-42 and accompall\ing text. 
257 See supra note 244-45 and accompandng text. 
258 See supra note 248-50 and accompall\ing text. 
259 See, e.g., Bowers Y. Hard\\ick. 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986) (holding that statute applY-
iug to all sodomy on its face is legal as applied to homosexuals); AlIIY D. Ronnel'. Bottoms 
Y. Bottoms: The LesbialllWother alld the Judicial Pelpetllation of Damaging Stereotypes. i YALE J.L. 
& FEMINISM 341, 356 (1995) (uuequal treatmeut of homosexual parents). 
260 See generally Yang. supra note 27. 
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members of society hold biases against homosexuals, which carries 
over to the jury box. 
The justice system has yet to implement tools to fight this bias, as 
it has done in certain instances for race or gender bias.261 Therefore, 
jury bias against homosexuals is used to the disadvantage of homo-
sexuals in a broad variety of circumstances. In cases where a defen-
dant or a victim in a sexual assault case is homosexual, rape shield 
statutes can be used against them.262 Homosexuality of a murder vic-
tim can be used to mitigate the crime to manslaughter if the defen-
dant claims that a homosexual advance caused him to lose his control 
and kill in the heat of passion.263 
vVe need to examine how our laws uphold the systemic bias 
against homosexuals to allow laws to be fairly applied. We must con-
sider how rape shield statutes will affect all people, not just hetero-
sexual people. vVe must also discredit and eliminate such backwards 
legal theories as the homosexual advance defense. 
The best way to combat this bias may be to uniformly allow the 
questioning of jurors about their attitudes toward homosexuality. An 
unbiased jury will not allow evidence of sexuality of the victim or de-
fendant to affect the outcome of the case. They will not care if the 
defendant in a rape case is gay or if the murder victim made a homo-
sexual advance. Questioning jurors on bias may help, but it will never 
be able to uncover all biases in order to produce unbiased juries in all 
cases. Only across-the-board societal change will ever create a truly 
equal justice for homosexuals within our judicial system, but, until 
that day, searching out bias and removing it from the jury can only 
help. 
261 See.generally. e.g., FED. R. EnD. 412; Batson Y. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
262 See supra Pan II. 
263 See supra Part III. 
